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In flesponse to a Question...
Nicholas Strobbe
In response to a question concerning the use of the term
'justiceable' in Error ofDisclosure what follows, I trust, will go
some way towards justifying what might otherwise seem a too
radical employment (though of course the radical would mark a
turning towards a filiation and a root that is not simply arbitrary;
leaving undetermined whether the filiation is originary and
unitary, even as a differential gathering for Heidegger, or
incommunicable and aporetic, absolutely other).
The determination concerning 'justiceable' I 'justiciable'
would be clarified only at the risk of entering into another
'unthought'. While attempting to remain faithful to the quite
correct 'justiciable', I did not want to refuse to respond to the
sense of the justice-able announced with this word. That is, a
justice (its crisis, aporia, and necessity) which is impossible to
accomplish or thetically determine but which is called for
nevertheless in this necessity, and even out of this impossibility,
and attested to in the judgements of Brennan, Deane and
Gaudroo, and Dawson JJ in Mabo (No 2). There is no easy way
ofavoiding the sense of the 'able' in justice (who would want to?
in the name ofwhat?) without, in some sense, encountering its. ..
mISprISIon.
The 'Justiceable': Here, for guidance, one could trace the
etymological character of the suffix in question. F justiciable,
amenable to a jurisdiction, L justitiabilis, liable to be tried in a
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court of justice, subject to jurisdiction. 'Able', -abilis, adjectival
suffix, the final silent (e' dropped, frpm L habitis, habeo, to be
handled, fit, suitable, make ready, to be legally qualified 1708,
more generally as having sufficient power and authority or
qualifications. L habeo - from -ble, -bili, -bi/em, has the sense
of given to, tending to, fit to, able to, from CtlUO, arcrro (hapo,
hapto) -' to have, to hold, to have power over, to rule, to gain, to
fasten, to touch, to affect, but also to perceive (grasped with the
senses), to apprehend, and also to reach or to overtake. G Habe,
defined as oVO'la, belongings, property, holdings, possessions.
The 'able' in justice-ability is indicative ofwhat would be
able to be done in law, an 'ability' encountered by the bench of
the High Court in its consideration of the question of law as it
devolved around a nonjusticiability in la~ and which is recorded
here, but which it is not able to enact or make real. Hence, this
crisis oflaw and in law - justice - which is what law would be
drawn to, touch on, and remain responsible to, but which it
cannot communicate or adjudicate. Here where law is extended
into jus,tice and responsibilit}', but where what is 'able) or may be
handled draws out an exteriority that is not the identical ofjustice
or response, we could not say that law is in a specific sense
incommensurate with justice. That is, this distance does not mean
that there can be no law and justice and responsibility, but that
this possibility arises with this distance. Justice is outstripped-
exteriorised in its 'ability'. Yet, it is not a quale or anything onto-
thea-logical, but akrisis and a response to an unassimilable
distance.
This is a crisis that would not be given over to a principia!
essentiality, the truth of an original decision (e.g. the dis-
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appointment of theology and the essential withdrawal of the
sensuous from the supersensible) or a final decision or last
judgement. Nor is this krisis indicative ofa voluntarist drive, or a
fundamental need (as Hegel puts it in the Difference essay) that
would be essentially sublatable. It is, perhaps, closer to
Kierkegaard's 'decision', but it is not grounded in subjectivit]T, or
in an immanent religio-aesthetics, or the individual's poverty and
indirection before God. It is, rather, and here the risk involves
moving both too closely and too far with Heidegger, a crisis and
a decision that takes place in the appropriation of the event
(Ereignis), but which cannot be named or thought ofas either as
Being, or Sein, Sein under erasure ('X'), the more archaic Seyn,
aAt7gela, Lichtung, or Heidegger's determination from his last
decade of work of the 'untrembling heart'. Krist's here, rather,
would mark a trembling and a caesura in what takes place
(echoing Anaximander and Heraclitus differenetly), and signifY
a certain rupture in the midst of philosophy. And perhaps even
philosophy as rupture - a kind of cession, then, and a
frag(e)ment, h~nce philosophy and writing as an impossible
combination. How would one respond to such a refusal and
respect its alterity? This, at least, opens onto the question of a
certain formal determination in writing, and why the frag(e)ment
is not a paragraph (there is nothing beyond it or parallel to it), or
a section, but it is perhaps a passage {that is, not a place, one
fixed and purified by a border that would be more pure than the
pure it in-holds, and hence the metaphysical of the border, but
perhaps a certain passage, a (non)passage and(non)site), or a
frag(e)ment (a questioning and irreducible fragment and a crisis
of finitude), or what I might call now cessions. The frag(e)ment
would be nonpresent to itself, a writing and a cession incapable
of meeting its alterity itself. Which is to say, a writing ex-posed
251
Strobbe
to another memory and a memory of the Other, a writing l
exposure, or denudation and a sign bereft of the body, which i5
not to say that it has no body but that this body is differentiaJ
and heterogeneous. (The frag(e)ment, lacking a self-sustaining
presence, would mark the trace of an exposure to this inter-
ruption. A frag(e)ment and an interruption, then, whose
temporality is no guide to a nonpresent presence, or a future oj
this presence, or a history reformed in the concrete and real [the
real, it is intimated, has a future, though one before which the
present of the real is never sufficient]' but the intempestivity of
an inter-ruption and a krisis. What if presence were no longer a
Sein but a krist's and a decision? What if ethics were not a prate
philosophia but a decision and a necessity [without ground]?
Hence ethics and judgement as exlpression of a finitude without
end. And hence a writing without reserve; that is, one that is
abandoned to exposure, and encounters the absence of its site at
its dislposal.)
Handlung: What do we handle? What kind of being are
we? Th~ question is taken up in an exemplary manner by
Heidegger who argues that we are beings marked by questioning;
that is, we take up the question and pose it insofar as we are the
expose-d ones. More particularly, for a reading of the 'able' in
question, Heidegger examines the relation ofpraxis to Handlung
in the 1942-3 Parmenides lectures and points out how the human,
as this one who possesses language ('TO 'epov Myov £xov) also
possesses hands (what this living animal has or possesses, echein,
is logos, language or discourse, but this having which it holds)
and which is its holding, will also signify writing). Here, the
question ofwhat one does and is capable ofdoing or handling is
intimately connected with logos and measure, and hence with
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right and rule. It is such a relation between right or law (ius) and
both de-termination and practice that I have attempted to resp~nd
to, where justice and the question ofits handling were not simply
opposed but drawn into akrisis. (A further question would have
to consider, very carefully, the historical transformation of the
relation oflaw to logos and mythos, with particular attention to
justice and dike, and the relation of equality and good law, or
eunomia (Solon), and proto-democratic law isonomia
(Kleisthenes» .
The hand, following Heidegger's expOSitIon - not
forgetting that this hse1f is already a work ofhand, a work drawn
out in images and signs which the hand already signs, and signs
in its being-exposed (Dasein is not simply the there-being, da-
sein, but is there [dort] and here [hier] in its being there), and
hence the departure of an immernorable exposure -, makes its
presencing eVIdent in the production and disc10sedness ofsigns
or writing. This account of the withdrawing hand made evident
in its erasure with the word recalls, for me, the rotating O'n]Aal
of Greek antiquity, those rotating stone posts engraved with the
laws of the city-state in a public and open place for everyone to
turn with their hands and read. In any case, the double relation
of withdrawing-unconcealing, trace and identit)!, at least as this
is suggestive for the reading lam proposing, would point to an
impossibility (e.g., signed by Brennan et at of the High Court)
of justice signing its name; or, rather, a possibility that justice
could point to or indicate its aporia (here, perhaps, indicative of
a certain justiciability and justice-ability), and hence a skandalon
for law. Further, this too would raise the question whether law (-
leg, legein, gathered together, -lex, legere, the legible of writing)
were not the trace of an impossible limit of justice, no less than
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the trace ofskandalon and aporia. (Would justice'callon the aporia
oflaw? Are we capable ofhandling this detour? Signing it?Would
justice name an incomparability and impossibilityofthis distance?
But law signs, and law signs it multiply, in different hands, with
the hands of difference, incapable of handling (signing) thi~
nonidentical justice. As if [the question of] justic(e)(i)ability
marked a repetition and a difference ofwhat is without relation,
absolutely other, ungraspable and unknowable, which is not to
say unthinkable, and yet not the all-turning heart of an absolute
One.)
Justice, accordingly (and these would remain provisional
considerations, at least already drawn into a trace and exposure
ofwriting), would be handed down in the law, turning not into
its distance (how would it turn into its distance or meet it? as if
in turning into its distance it could encounter itsdfwithout delay)
but would respond to this distance by turning away from it,
responding to this de-tour with a delay (both a force, a turning,
and a gathering). What would be called for here, then, would
mark the face of the absolutely asymmetrical Other, this Other
who precedes me and who is absolutely without precedent (but
not including here the positivity of Levinas' Platonic Good
[ara86vJ, and following Caputo's critique of an ethical first
philosophy). Justice-here would open in its response to the
absolute singularity ofthe Other and to this distance - re-laying
(lego) in the de-tour a responsibility/respons-ability (re-spondere,
to promise in return, spondeo, promise, engage, CJ1tevDm, to make
atruce or treat)!, to offer a libation) to this crisis which calls on it.
The question ofHeidegger's retrieval ofa founding moment
in an originary and disdosive relation with Being is nevertheless
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less easily concluded. On the one hand, this response would appeal
to a repetition (Wiederholung) and a differential beginning. On
the other hand (if these two response"s could so easily be dis-
played), the appeal is conservative. The hand, and handlingness,
is an act of mediation from an unfolding origin out ofwhich the
ontological difference comes into manifestation - i.e., it becomes
manifest, becomes in its manifesting, and marks beings in their
exposure as manifestation. But perhaps what needs to be recalled
here is already announced with the manifest - manus (hand) +
festus (struck), the manifest, the apparent, is struck lfendo), such
that the visible, what is seen or read, appears not simply as a
result or as an object of an action of the hand, but is a strike, a
blow, a force and a violence (cpepro, to bring forth, present, to
bear, endure, achieve). Certainly what is experiencable here in
regard to the blow or strike echoes Heideggees description of
language as a strike (Schlag), and with it a certain account of
mediacy. But the poet who mediates and communicates this
beginning and origination (hence Holderlin as the poet of the
German (origin)nation), and who speaks the origin originally in
its beginning essentially by fateful necessity or destin)', handing
it down as it were, must include the sense that this origin, even
as disclosive withdrawing, even in the still untrembling heart of
the essence of aA.7j8Ela or truth, is communicable, even if not
communicated. In drawing the hand the hand makes visible,
makes able according to an originary order - but what if law
and justice could not meet this incommunicable immediacy? what
if law and justice communicate without a communication with
the immediate? as though law and justice were now to
communicate in an indirection?
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Here, perhaps·, in a penultimate comment, I would return
to the paragraph commencing with (~t the limit oflaw.)) -Law;
here, at its limit (Terra Australis, Gondwanaland), discloses its
error. It overtakes its limit (viz. English common law) without
having encountered what preceded it (the Other, the
nonphenomenological trace ofthe Other after Levinas). Another
encounter awaits it (this is its limit, a limit which however it
does not contain), an encounter with the absolutely Other which
would not calIon us entering this distance, occupying it, but in
turning away from, turning as it were inlto the de-tour of an
other response. Hence, a return oflaw to be made in its re-sponse
to the event of its dis-closure, a return marked according to the
turn of its de-lay. But this return would not have led it to its
originary site, it would not mark an originary return
communicated in its immediacy, its return to itself, but to a turn
and a self that takes place as a krisis, an abandonment, and a
dispersion, hence the reference two fragments later to a taking
place. Taking place here signals a double response to a pre-Socr~tic
sense of a troubled or strife torn justice (Anaximander, but also
Antigone) and existence (Heraclitus), and Heidegger's reflection
on the event of appropriation, this event or happening of a
nonpresent Being that properises through an accord - to the
heart, in the direction of the heart, cordis, though isn't the heart
a problematic ground? doesn't the heart make us tremble? would
not the heart mark an interruption of the classical philosophical
ground? - an appropriation and expr-opriation, a displacement
marked through the figure of the (non)site.
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